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2004-2005 FOURTH CIRCUIT SUMMARY
SAMUEL R. BRUMBERG* AND CHRISTOPHER D. SUPINO**
Each year, the staff of the Environmental Law and Policy
Review explores significant cases from the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit as part of its ongoing commitment to serve
practitioners as well as the academic community. This section of
the Review provides synopses of important and recent decisions of
the Fourth Circuit. It does not contain every decision issued from
the Fourth Circuit, but rather concentrates on those which the
editors believe would be of the most interest to our subscribers.
I. COMMERCE CLAUSE: HARPER V. WEST VIRGINIA PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION1
A significant case involving the Commerce Clause2 was
brought before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
the winter of this past term. Argued on October 28, 2004, and
decided on January 24, 2005, the case of Harper v. West Virginia
Public Service Commission highlighted the still-important
influence of constitutional jurisprudence on environmental issues.
West Virginia requires those engaged in the collection,
transport, and disposal of solid waste to receive a certificate of
convenience and necessity from the Public Service Commission.3
* Samuel R. Brumberg is a 2006 J.D. candidate attending the William and Mary
School of Law. Mr. Brumberg received a B.A. summa cum laude in Political
Science from the University of Richmond in 2003. During the 2005-2006
academic year, Mr. Brumberg will serve as the Managing Editor of the
Environmental Law and Policy Review.
** Christopher D. Supino is a 2006 J.D. candidate attending the William and
Mary School of Law. Mr. Supino received an A.B. summa cum laude in English
from Cornell University in 2003. During the 2005-2006 academic year, Mr.
Supino will serve as a Senior Articles Editor for the Review.
1 396 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2005).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
' Harper, 396 F.3d at 350. A "certificate of convenience and necessity,"
sometimes also called a "certificate of public convenience and necessity" or
849
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLIY REV. [Vol. 29:849
In the current economic environment, emphasizing deregulation
of traditionally-regulated industries, the Public Service Com-
mission of West Virginia had effectively granted an exclusive
franchise to a number of disposal services in certain geographical
areas.4 Harper and his company, Southern Ohio Disposal, wanted
to do business in spite of their lack of a certificate from the
Commission.5 The Commission prohibited Southern Ohio Disposal
from doing business, and the owner and his company sued in
federal court to prevent enforcement of the Commission's order.6
The regulated system of certificates was implemented to " [prevent]
unnecessary multiplication of service" and applied to all in-state
competitors.7
The new issue addressed by the Fourth Circuit in Harper
opened the door to evaluation of the constitutionality of West
Virginia's regulation of trash collectors. The district court found
that the federal courts should abstain from deciding the case under
the Younger abstention doctrine.8 The Fourth Circuit reversed and
remanded, holding that
"CPCN," is often required when working in regulated industries, such as energy,
telecommunications, and water and sewer services. In West Virginia, it is also
required for solid waste removal. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2-5(a) (Michie
2004).
4 Some of these companies intervened in the case at the district court and are
named as intervenors/defendant-appellees in the Fourth Circuit case. See
Harper, 396 F.3d at 348.
5 Id. at 349.6Id.
7 Id. at 350 (quoting W. VA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2-5(a) (Michie 2004)).
'Harper v. PSC, 291 F. Supp. 2d 443, 462 (S.D. W. Va. 2003) (citing Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). The district court also found that Buford v. Sun Oil
Co. was an appropriate ground for an abstention. See Buford v. Sun Oil Co., 319
U.S. 315 (1943). The Fourth Circuit found that the district court's application of
Buford was inappropriate. Harper, 396 F.3d at 357-58.
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[t]he values of comity and federalism protected by
Younger are undeniably important. But the state
interests at stake here do not fall among those the
federal courts have repeatedly recognized as deser-
ving of special respect and solicitude. Moreover, the
federal interest asserted under the commerce power
lies at the core of the commercial values protected by
that clause, namely the promotion of robust trade
and enterprise among the several states.9
This opened the door to further examination of West Virginia's
regulations by the district court. Pointing to a similar case on the
issue of medical waste transport, the Fourth Circuit alluded to the
fact that West Virginia's restrictions on market entry may be
unconstitutional. ° The central holding in the previous decision
was that "West Virginia's goal of providing universal service at
reasonable rates may well be a legitimate state purpose, but
restricting market entry does ,not serve that purpose."" Harper
was remanded to the district court, relying heavily on precedent
that interests affecting interstate commerce must be examined in
federal court and must not be dismissed via abstention, even in
light of serious state health, welfare, and environmental con-
cerns.' 2 The case involved a "vital federal question," and must be
heard in federal court.'3 It remains to be seen what the end result
will be in the Harper case.
9 Harper, 396 F.3d at 350.
10 Id. at 351 (citing Medigen of Kentucky, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 985
F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1993)).
"Id. (quoting Medigen, 985 F.2d at 167).
12 Id. at 357 (citing Medigen).
1Id. at 358 (emphasis in original).
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II. EMINENT DOMAIN & NATURAL GAS ACT: EAST TENNESSEE
NATURAL GAS COMPANY V. SAGE
14
In this eminent domain case, the East Tennessee Natural Gas
Company ("East Tennessee") received a certificate of public
convenience and necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC"), which enabled it to condemn property
pursuant to the Natural Gas Act.'5 The Fourth Circuit affirmed a
decision by the district court which used equitable jurisdiction to
permit the company to access the condemned property immediately
so as to install the pipeline without delay. The installation, it was
reasoned, would be in the public interest. 16 Contrary to the wishes
of landowners, just compensation for the property would need not
be determined prior to the actual taking.
This case involved a pre-judgment possession of property
which was the subject of a condemnation proceeding. Although the
Natural Gas Act allows for just compensation via a condemnation
action, the Act does not allow for immediate possession of the
condemned land. 7 The Fourth Circuit held that the district court
could, however, grant injunctive relief to hand immediate
possession of the land to East Tennessee." It also noted that the
substance of the injunctions entered against landowners were
sound.'9 For environmental law practitioners, it should be noted
that FERC, in the course of granting a certificate, must make an
evaluation of the environmental impact of the proposed gas
pipeline and issue an impact statement.2 °
14 361 F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 2004), reh'g denied and reh'g en banc denied, 369 F.3d
357 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, _ U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 478 (2004), and cert.
denied, __ U.S. -, 125 S. Ct. 479 (2004).15 See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2000).
16 See Sage, 361 F.3d at 823-28.
17 Id. at 818.18 Id.
19 Id.20Id. (citing for reference 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000)).
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The district court applied, and the Fourth Circuit approved,
the methodological analysis ordinarily used to grant a preliminary
injunction. 2' No heightened standard was applied. The use of an
injunction was neither a "straight condemnation" nor a "quick-take
condemnation," two of the more common proceedings in federal
eminent domain proceedings. 22 The court concluded that
[iun sum, we hold that once a district court deter-
mines that a gas company has the substantive right
to condemn property under the [Natural Gas Act], the
court may use its equitable power to grant the
remedy of immediate possession through the issuance
of a preliminary injunction. Because the district court
did not abuse its discretion in granting preliminary
injunctive relief to [East Tennessee] in these cases,
we affirm the district court's orders.23
III. CERCLA AND RCRA: SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL V. COMMERCE &
INDUSTRY INSURANCE Co.
24
This case addressed the question of whether the "direct action"
provision of RCRA25 may be used to pursue a claim arising under
CERCLA.2
6
21 Id. at 820 (citing Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville, Inc. v. Selig, 550
F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977)). The court analyzed factors such as the likelihood of
irreparable harm to East Tennessee, the likelihood of irreparable harm to the
landowners, East Tennessee's likelihood of success on the merits (conceded by
the landowners and all but assured by the Natural Gas Act and FERC's
certificate), and the public interest. Sage, 361 F.3d at 828-31.
22 See Sage, 361 F.3d at 820-22.
23 Id. at 831.
24 372 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2004).
25 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (2000). RCRA is the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, which begins in codified form at 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (2000).
26 CERCLA, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
8532005]
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Stoller Chemical Company ("Stoller") operated a fertilizer
manufacturing plant in South Carolina from 1978 to 1992. This
facility was classified as a hazardous waste treatment, storage,
and disposal facility pursuant to RCRA.27 In order to obtain
building permits under RCRA, Stoller was required to obtain
insurance against damage or injures that the plant caused to third
parties.2" Appellee insurance companies provided this RCRA
liability insurance to Stoller and filed the RCRA-mandated
certificates with the South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control ("DHEC").29
Stoller closed its fertilizer plant and declared bankruptcy
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in 1992.30 An investiga-
tion subsequently revealed that the property surrounding the plant
was chemically contaminated and required remediation.31 DHEC
initiated CERCLA enforcement proceedings against several corpor-
ations that faced partial CERCLA liability for their use of the
property during its operation.3 2 These parties, which the court
called the "corporate claimants," settled and sought contribution
from the defendant-appellees (the "insurance companies") as
insurers of Stoller.33 The district court found in favor of the
insurance companies, and the corporate claimants appealed.34
Liability Act, begins in codified form at 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2000). CERCLA is also
commonly referred to as "Superfund." See Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 372 F.3d
at 249.27 Id. at 252.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 252-53. EPA authorized South Carolina's Department of Health and
Environmental Control to act as its principal enforcement agency for RCRA
claims arising in South Carolina pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (2000).
Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 372 F.3d at 254.30 Id. at 253. Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code begins at 11 U.S.C. § 701 (2000).
Bankruptcies filed under Chapter 7 of the Code are traditionally known as
"liquidation bankruptcies."
"' Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 372 F.3d at 253.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 253-55.
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The corporate claimants, including various steel manu-
facturers, wanted to collect directly from the insurance companies
in order to avoid getting involved in Stoller's bankruptcy
proceedings.35 The Fourth Circuit noted that Congress made
specific provisions for such expedient measures.36 Both CERCLA
and RCRA contain "direct action" provisions that allow a party to
obtain ajudgment directly against an insurance company that has
provided "evidence of financial responsibility" in the form of a
certificate of insurance." All parties agreed that the insurance
companies did not provide CERCLA insurance coverage to Stoller,
but rather that the insurance companies had issued a certificate as
to their financial responsibility under RCRA only. The corporate
claimants argued that the words "any claim" in section 6924(t)
referred to claims arising under CERCLA as well as RCRA.3" The
procedural right of RCRA "direct actions," therefore, would extend
to substantive claims arising under CERCLA.3 9
In analyzing the corporate claimants' arguments, the Fourth
Circuit noted that RCRA and CERCLA often overlap and are
confused.4' Both were enacted by Congress to address the same
broad concern over the creation of unhealthy and environmentally
dangerous conditions by industry.4' The Fourth Circuit noted,
however, that while the broad policy goals of the two statutes
3 See id. at 254.
36 See id. at 249, 250 n.1 & 250-51.
31 Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 372 F.3d at 249. RCRA's direct action provision
is located at 42 U.S.C. § 6924(t)(2) (2000). If the site owner or operator is in
bankruptcy or reorganization, or under state insolvency proceedings, the claims
which would ordinarily be asserted against the owner or operator may be
asserted directly against the guarantor. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 372 F.3d
at 249.38 Id. at 256-57.
39 See id. at 256-57.
" See generally id. at 255-59 (containing the court's analysis in addressing the
claims under the overlapping statutes).411Id.
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might be the same, each act was created to address its own distinct
problems."
RCRA was passed to allow claims "concerning present and
future threats to human health and to the environment, as oppo-
sed to claims seeking to recover the costs of environmental cleanup
activities."43 CERCLA, in contrast, "serves goals that are remedial
and curative rather than preventative."' The court thus concluded
that whereas CERCLA liability is designed to equitably apportion
responsibility for cleaning up past mistakes once they happen,
RCRA liability is restricted to preventing the occurrence of these
mistakes in the first place.45
The Fourth Circuit used the distinction between the purposes
of RCRA and CERCLA liability to reject the corporate claimants'
argument that nothing in the RCRA direct action provision
precluded them from pursuing claims under that provision arising
under CERCLA.46 The court specifically rejected the corporate
claimants' reading of the "any claim" language in the RCRA direct
action provision noting that "they misapprehend the context in
which the term. . . is used. Read in context, the term 'any claim'
refers to any claim arising from conduct for which the insurer
provided evidence of financial liability."47 Because the insurance
companies only provided a RCRA certificate of insurance, their
liability must be limited to substantive RCRA claims.4 These
would not include the costs of a remedial CERCLA cleanup.49
In rejecting the corporate claimants' arguments, the Fourth
Circuit noted that allowing the direct action provision of RCRA to
42 Id. at 255.
41 Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 372 F.3d at 255.
4Id. at 256 (citation omitted).
45 See id. 255-56.
46 Id. at 256-59.
47 Id. at 256 (emphasis in original).
48Id.
41 Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 372 F.3d at 256-57.
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apply to CERCLA claims would set an undesirable precedent. °
Interpreting the "any claim" language to include liability outside
the scope ofRCRA would broaden RCRA insurance to an untenable
degree.5' RCRA liability insurance would cease to have any
relation to hazardous waste management. 2 Taken to its logical
conclusion, it could cease to have any principled limit. "If this
position were valid, then Congress has also authorized the RCRA
provision to be used.., to pursue negligence claims arising from
auto accidents resulting from the operation of such facilities. 53
The court concluded that there was nothing in the legislative
history of RCRA in general, or the direct action provision in
particular, that sanctioned such a broad interpretation of the "any
claim" language.54 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the RCRA
direct action provision must be limited to RCRA-based claims.5 5 It
affirmed the dismissal order of the district court.
56
50 Id. at 257.




51 Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 372 F.3d at 257.56 Id. at 261.
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